A Better Predictor of People Is Not a Better Synthetic Person: What Compute Scaling Laws for LLM Social Simulation Measure, Why Hyper-Rational and Flattened Simulators Mostly Measure Something Else, and the Deviation Test That Would Separate Knowing About People From Knowing the Answer
Abstract
Life of Research
Language models are proposed as stand-ins for survey respondents and experimental participants, and a 2026 study asked whether the current scaling paradigm will make them faithful enough. Across 85 base models trained under fixed compute budgets, it found that loss on opinion, behaviour and longitudinal simulation tasks falls log-linearly with compute, and it concluded that scale will improve social simulation in most settings. A separate literature reports the opposite tendency in more capable models: answers to crowd-estimation questions that are unhumanly exact, intuitive errors that vanish, risky choices predicted as more rational than people make them, and opinion distributions collapsed onto one option. In this analysis the author reviews and synthesises published results to show that the two literatures mostly measure different quantities under the one word "fidelity". The scaling evidence scores a model as a predictor: the probability it assigns to recorded human responses, mostly in base models. Most of the contrary evidence scores a model as a participant whose sampled behaviour is compared with people's, mostly after post-training, and much of it concerns the part of human behaviour that departs from the normative or knowledge-best answer. The author derives that top-1 accuracy and typicality tests cannot reward dispersion, that a perfectly modal responder beats the uniform baseline on a binary item exactly when the human majority exceeds 75 percent, and that wherever the human mode coincides with the normative option, knowing the answer is indistinguishable from knowing people. Two results do reach the predictor role in base models: reading-time fit that worsens as perplexity falls, which the split accommodates only through an untested conjecture, and survey responses that become near-uniform under randomised option order irrespective of size, which it does not explain. The paper consolidates 31 published results in a table and a figure, re-reads the source study's own exceptions, gives a reading procedure, and specifies a deviation-weighted evaluation that would separate the two kinds of gain.
Questions about this paper
Who wrote "A Better Predictor of People Is Not a Better Synthetic Person"?
Pranay Mahendrakar wrote "A Better Predictor of People Is Not a Better Synthetic Person: What Compute Scaling Laws for LLM Social Simulation Measure, Why Hyper-Rational and Flattened Simulators Mostly Measure Something Else, and the Deviation Test That Would Separate Knowing About People From Knowing the Answer", published 7 Nov 2026. Pranay Mahendrakar is an Indian AI specialist and LLM engineer based in Bengaluru, India. He is the Managing Director of SonyTech, Nodal Coordinator at IIRS-ISRO, and an instructor at Tutorials Point. His work covers large language models, natural language processing, computer vision and retrieval-augmented generation. He publishes open-access research papers and is the author of three books: Just AI With Pranay, Multiverse of AI and It's Me LLM.
Is "A Better Predictor of People Is Not a Better Synthetic Person" free to read?
Yes. "A Better Predictor of People Is Not a Better Synthetic Person" by Pranay Mahendrakar is open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence, with the full PDF available from Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24024332. There is no paywall and no account required.
How do I cite "A Better Predictor of People Is Not a Better Synthetic Person"?
Cite the DOI: Mahendrakar, P. (2026). A Better Predictor of People Is Not a Better Synthetic Person: What Compute Scaling Laws for LLM Social Simulation Measure, Why Hyper-Rational and Flattened Simulators Mostly Measure Something Else, and the Deviation Test That Would Separate Knowing About People From Knowing the Answer. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24024332 A BibTeX entry is provided on this page.